Certain analogies between moral and epistemological problems
Category: Hume
A “sifting humour”
The inductionist’s bluff
Whose problem is the problem of induction?
How much we may presuppose…
From Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777 edition), pp. 80-6.
From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume, that there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the […]
A new species of optics
From Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1777 edition), p. 62.
Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource […]
Cockroaches and Balloons:
Weiningerian Reactions to a Distractionist
In the following oblique philosophical rant, occasioned by nihilist/distractionist George (whose views can seem bleaker even than Luno’s), Luno reveals his own lively obsession with dividing up the moral world in two, one part governed by a feminine, the other by a (you guessed it!) masculine imperative. —Ed. note.
(Distractionist) GEORGE:
It would seem any moral theory […]
