Category: Deontology

Abortion, Sex, and the Limits of Morality - Part II

Lessons for moral theory taken from the morality of abortion
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Utility and women
In the realm of ethics, the notion of rights is little more than three centuries old, that of utility less, that of virtue two millenia. But that of care we must assume is pre-historic.
There seem to be very few utilitarian philosophers who are women. […]

On being blotted out

Posted by luno in capital punishment, Criminality, Deontology, Kant, Moral Theory, Weininger (Thursday June 25, 2009 at 9:47 am)
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the point of the death penalty
The meaning of capital punishment—insofar as it has a meaning and is not a reflex—is concerned with the distribution of responsibility. The field of responsibility is limited to moral agents. Constituted authorities are not moral agents. Individuals, who are, may or may not be missing the requisite nerve. Usually, they […]

Moral terrorism, aka supererogation

Posted by luno in motherhood, philosophy and sex, sex differences, Deontology, Utilitarianism, Moral Theory (Wednesday October 3, 2007 at 11:31 am)
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In this classic paper in the literature on the idea of supererogation (acts above and beyond moral duty), Urmson argues for recognition of a special class of moral acts that, while clearly moral, cannot be required—at least not generally. In the course of his argument, he makes explicit a masculine assumption about the feminine relation to morality. Susan Wolf reacts to this paper. Together, Urmson’s seemingly off-handed remark and Wolf’s response, are symptomatic of the deep rift in moral perspective between women and men. The underlying clash of principles were first clearly examined by Otto Weininger a century ago. Luno picks up where Weininger left off, using Urmson and Wolf as philosophical occasions.

Persons with bodies and opinions

Posted by luno in philosophy and sex, rape, prostitution, sex differences, Deontology, Kant (Friday September 14, 2007 at 1:41 pm)
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O’Neill addresses the Kantian moral concepts of not treating others as means (i.e., using them) and treating them positively as persons, how these are related, and finally how “an adequate understanding of what it is to treat others as persons must view them not abstractly as possibly consenting adults, but as particular men and women with limited and determinate capacities to understand or consent to proposals of action.” The Kantian moral ideal so far as it has practical application must take account of human limitations.

Types of integrity

Posted by luno in sex differences, Moral Consciousness, Deontology, Utilitarianism, feminism, Moral Theory (Thursday January 4, 2007 at 1:18 pm)
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Notes on Cheshire Calhoun,“Standing for Something.”
[Against the background of some contemporary conceptions of integrity as a virtue, Calhoun will argue that this virtue, whatever private merit it may have, is in the end a “master” social virtue not only because of its deployment of so many other virtues but because of its critical role in […]

An affair of honor and the darkness of hell

Posted by luno in motherhood, philosophy and sex, abortion, sex differences, Utilitarianism, Deontology, Kant (Thursday December 21, 2006 at 12:41 pm)
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Notes on Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law (1796)
There are, however, two crimes worthy of death, in respect of which it still remains doubtful whether the Legislature have the Right to deal with them capitally.
And since they cannot be dealt with “capitally,” they cannot, on Kantian terms, quite be seen as murder.
It is the sentiment […]

When justice comes on a pretty pass

Posted by luno in political philosophy, Deontology, Kant, Moral Theory (Friday December 15, 2006 at 5:20 pm)
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Notes on Kant, “Theory and Practice,” part 2
From the concluding section:
It thus follows that all resistance against the supreme legislative power, all incitement of the subjects to violent expressions of discontent, all defiance which breaks out into rebellion, is the greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth, for it destroys its very foundations. This […]

none of his business

Posted by luno in motherhood, animals, female criminality, abortion, Deontology, sex differences, male criminality (Friday September 1, 2006 at 1:47 pm)
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Notes on:
Michael Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide.”
44
I do not share the general pessimism about the possibility of resolving the issue of abortion and infanticide because I believe it is possible to point to a very plausible moral principle dealing with the question of necessary conditions for something’s having a right to life, where the conditions in […]

The moral party: whom should we invite?

Posted by luno in animals, Heterocosmos, Moral Sentiment, sex differences, Deontology (Monday April 17, 2006 at 11:54 am)
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Notes on: Mary Anne Warren, “Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position”

A dubious internalist assumption

Posted by luno in epistemology, Moral Consciousness, Deontology, Kant (Friday December 23, 2005 at 2:54 pm)
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Notes on:
Matthias Steup, “A Defense of Internalism”
310
Steup takes “internalism to be the view that J-factors [things that make beliefs justified or not] must be directly recognizable, that is recognizable on reflection.” The idea is that if one has available now, or could deduce from what is available now, information to justify a belief then one […]

 
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